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Abstract
The following paper examines the historical origins and development of China’s advocacy of the 
principle of noninterference in its African foreign policy and suggests that in spite of its consis-
tent rhetorical support for noninterference over the last ﬁfty years, the relevance of the principle 
in shaping Beijing’s foreign policy decisions has varied as its pragmatic interests have shifted. 
China’s post-Maoist leadership, in the drive to win the African resources and markets needed to 
bolster its growing, export-driven economy, has utilized the practice of noninterference to win 
a foothold on the continent. As its level of investment in Africa and dependency on African 
energy resources and markets have expanded, however, Beijing has found limiting its actions 
vis-à-vis a policy of noninterference less tenable, and as recurrences of regional instability and 
anti-Chinese populism have threatened its interests, citizens, and assets on the continent, will 
likely take a more forceful role in its relations with partner states. 
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No country has the right to impose its will on others, nor can it undermine or deny 
other countries’ sovereignty under whatever excuse. Facts have proven that such prac-
tices as disregarding other’s sovereignty, bullying the small and the weak by dint of 
one’s size and power, and pursuing hegemony and power politics would not get any-
where. The aﬀairs of a country should be decided by its own people, and the aﬀairs of 
the world should be handled by consultation among all countries on an equal footing.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at a speech commemorating the 50th Anniver-
sary of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence ( June 28, 2004).1
Introduction
The recent emergence of China as a major outside player in Africa may prove 
to be a pivotal change in the historical course of the continent’s development. 
As opposed to Western powers and international ﬁnancial institutions, China 
has provided generous amounts of aid and investment without conditions 
attached. Rather than prodding its African partners to implement neoliberal 
reforms, as demanded by proponents of the Washington Consensus, Beijing 
instead emphasizes the principle of noninterference, mutual beneﬁts, and 
‘win-win’ relationships. Chinese leaders place importance on the sovereign 
equality of all countries and oﬀer to meet even the weakest of states on equal 
footing, respecting every government’s right to determine its own domestic 
policies.2 
China and its noninterference approach has consequently received a warm 
embrace from African leaders and large sections of the general public, as the 
memory of European colonialism and the disastrous eﬀects of prescribed 
neoliberal reforms, particularly the structural adjustment programs of the 
1980s, have generated much cynicism toward the policy prescriptions and 
conditional aid oﬀered by the West. The general reception of Beijing and its 
developmental model in Africa and throughout much of the developing 
world has led some scholars, most notably, Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004), to 
suggest that China is creating a new “Beijing Consensus” that is “remak(ing) 
1 Wen Jiabao, “Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promo-
tion of Peace and Development,” (Speech by Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, at Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of The Five Princi-
ples of Peaceful Coexistence, June 28, 2004), http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/topics/seminaronﬁve-
principles/t140777.htm (accessed January 30, 2009).
2 Ibid.
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the whole landscape of international development, economics, society and, 
by extension, politics.”3 
Assertions that Beijing, the China development model, and the policy of 
noninterference are fundamentally reshaping the international system should, 
however, be viewed critically. Should noninterference be interpreted as an 
important deﬁning feature of the Beijing’s foreign policy as implemented in 
practice or simply a useful rhetorical device? In practice, how and when, if 
ever, does China intervene in the domestic aﬀairs of its African allies? In the 
following paper, we will examine the historical origins and development of 
China’s usage of the principle of noninterference in its African foreign policy 
and suggest that in spite of its consistent rhetorical support for noninterfer-
ence over the last ﬁfty years, the relevance of the principle in shaping Beijing’s 
foreign policy decisions has varied as its strategic interests have shifted. Chi-
na’s post-Maoist leadership, in the drive to win the African resources and 
markets needed to bolster its growing, export-driven economy, has utilized 
the practice of noninterference to gain a foothold on the continent. As its 
level of investment in Africa and reliance on African energy resources and 
markets have expanded, Beijing has found limiting its actions vis-à-vis a pol-
icy of noninterference less tenable, and as recurrences of regional instability 
and anti-Chinese populism have threatened its interests, citizens, and assets 
on the continent, will likely take a more forceful role in its relations with 
partner states. 
Understanding China’s Brand of Noninterference 
The term ‘noninterference’ was enunciated by the “Declaration on the Inad-
missibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Aﬀairs of States” 
(hereafter, “the Declaration”) approved by the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 9, 1981. Building upon the earlier 1965 Declaration 
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Aﬀairs of States and 
the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty and the 1970 Declara-
tion on the Strengthening of International Security, the Declaration denies 
states “the right to interfere or intervene in the internal and external aﬀairs of 
other states”4 but uses language far too general in deﬁning speciﬁc acts of 
3 Joshua Cooper Ramo, “The Beijing Consensus,” The Foreign Policy Center (2004), 3 http://
joshuaramo.com/_ﬁles/pdf/The-Beijing-Consensus.pdf (accessed February 3, 2009).
4 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and 
Interference in the Internal Aﬀairs of States, approved on December 9, 1981, http://www.un.
org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r103.htm (accessed February 3, 2009). 
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interference or intervention for usage in this article. It also designates the 
signing of treaties and creation of alliances with third-party states or military 
blocs as forms of interference, concerns that are outside the scope of this 
investigation. Drawing upon the content of the document, a good under-
standing of China’s lack of desire to comment on the controversial issues cat-
egorized as “internal aﬀairs” will require the simplifying and clarifying which 
speciﬁc state actions constitute acts of intervention or interference and there-
fore represent violations of the principle of noninterference: 
1) Using armed intervention or the threat of force to disrupt the political, 
social or economic order of another state or change its political system.
2) Using direct armed intervention or subversion to undermine the stability 
of another state. 
3) Allowing one’s own territory to be used by rebellious or secessionist move-
ments to indirectly subvert the stability or institutions of another state.
4) Arming or otherwise supporting rebellious or secessionist movements or 
mercenaries within another state’s territory. 
5) Employing hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening in the inter-
nal aﬀairs of another state or undermining its stability.
6) Using one’s power and inﬂuence to prevent a state from freely determining 
its own political, social and economic development. This includes the 
unsanctioned (by the United Nations) use of economic blockades to 
interfere in a foreign state’s internal aﬀairs. 
While this deﬁnition for noninterference is certainly far from perfect, it rep-
resents China’s very articulation of the principles by which it has largely and 
consistently dealt with its South-South linkages. The ﬁve principles of nonin-
terference, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality 
and mutual beneﬁt, mutual non-aggression, peaceful coexistence (hereafter, 
“the Five Principles” ), worked out by Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to reduce border tensions and improve Sino-In-
dian relations on June 28, 1954 was later expanded to discursively cover Chi-
na’s external relations with other states, particularly those in the developing 
world, starting with Burma on June 29, 1954.5 In the case of Burma, this 
only represented the beginning of a series of Joint Communiqué, which all 
emphasized friendship and cooperation based on the Five Principles. Notable 
among these Sino-Burmese Joint Communiqués was the one on April 17-19, 
5 China’s Foreign Relations: A Chronology of Events (1949-1988) (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1989): 207.
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1966, in which the Chinese President, Liu Shaoqi, indirectly referred to the 
activities of the U.S. and its allies in Vietnam as acts of “imperialist subver-
sion and interference” into the internal aﬀairs of Asia.6 Three decades later, 
and following the refusal of the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) of Burma to recognize the victory of National League for Democ-
racy (NLD) led by Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, who was put under “house arrest,” 
a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced on December 15, 
1994 that “China never interferes in any aﬀairs which belong to the internal 
aﬀairs of Burma.”7 The same statement was later echoed by the then Chinese 
Prime Minister, Li Peng, who stated in Yangon that “Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
aﬀairs are Myanmar’s (Burma) internal aﬀairs, where we do not interfere.”8 
Burma serves as an instructive case for observing China’s advocacy of non-
interference, as these rhetorical framings have deﬁned China’s actions and 
narratives toward its other partners in global interactions. The challenge, 
according to Alden and Hughes (2009),9 is how China balances the often 
tenuous compatibility between noninterference and its aspirations to become 
a global stakeholder in the case of Sino-African relations. 
Noninterference and South-South Cooperation 
Shortly after Zhou and Nehru’s meeting in 1954, delegates from twenty-nine 
Asian and African countries met in Bandung, Indonesia, aﬃrming the Five 
Principles, which would shape the agenda of the emerging Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). At the Bandung Conference in the week of April 18-24, 
1955, Japan was the only First World country to attend the conference, and 
even though it was not part of the NAM, it supported the tenets of the orga-
nization.10 The Bandung Declaration served as a turning point in modern 
world history, initiating the age of the non-aligned world, which in turn rev-
olutionized relations between China and its neighbors as well as other mem-
bers of the NAM, who all adopted the Five Principles to guide their foreign 
relations. 
 6 “China-Burma Joint Communiqué, April 19, 1966,” Peking Review 9:17 (22 April 1966): 5. 
 7 See Pozeb Vang, Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies (Bloomington, IN: Author 
House, 2008): 393.
 8 Ibid. 
 9 Alden C. and Hughes, “Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa Strategy: Some Implica-
tions for Foreign Policy,” China Quarterly (September 2009): 563-584.
10 Vang, 1-2.
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In 1955, Zhou Enlai (China), Nehru (India), Sukarno (Indonesia), and 
Nasser (Egypt), who were key ﬁgures and decision makers in the Bandung 
Conference, supported the idea that a resolution on world peace should be 
based on the Five Principles. President Sukarno stated, “This is the ﬁrst inter-
continental conference of the so-called colored people in the history of 
mankind.”11 Nasser added that there were two prerequisites for world peace – 
noninterference in other nation’s aﬀairs and the right of all nations to choose 
their own political and economic system.”12 In his closing speech for the con-
ference Nehru stated that:
We are brothers not only because we are Asians and Africans, but also because we are 
linked by the immeasurable wish for peace, resolute resistance to all dictates, ﬁrm 
determination to raise ourselves from backwardness. I am deeply convinced that we 
have made a great achievement here, not only to the beneﬁt of Asia and Africa, but 
for the whole of mankind as well.13
This immense belief in noninterference guided China’s eﬀorts to reach out to 
other countries in the developing world by ﬁrst identifying itself with the 
developing world, and then gradually working its way to leadership in the 
Global South, which Lumumba-Kasongo (2007)14 argues is a central part 
of Chinese political engagements in Africa. In April 1974, Deng Xiaoping, 
Chairman of the delegation of the PRC to the Sixth Special Session of the 
United Nations and Vice Premier of the State Council of the PRC, presented 
an address in which he identiﬁed “three worlds” in the international system, 
of which the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were 
the Third World. Referring to Russia and the U.S. as the two superpowers 
that threatened the independence and security of nations through control, 
subversion, interference or aggression, Deng Xiaoping said China was a 
socialist country, a developing country and also belonged to the Third World. 
He then categorically stated that “China is not a superpower, nor will she 
ever seek to be one.”15 
From the Bandung Conference, which represented a watershed event for 
initiating and strengthening South-South Cooperation, China has empha-
sized the noninterference clause embedded in the Five Principles in almost 
11 “Bandung Conference,” Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (May 7-14, 1955): 14182.
12 Ibid., 14181.
13 “Conference in Bandung,” Review of International Aﬀairs 5:1222 (May 1, 1955): 11. 
14 Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, “China-Africa Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Dialec-
tics of Rethinking South-South Dialogue,” CODESRIA Bulletin 1&2 (2007): 8-16.
15 “Chairman of the Delegation Teng Hsiao-Ping’s Speech,” Peking Review 17:16 (19 April 
1974): 6-11. 
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every interaction with other developing states, even in the face of complex 
emerging realities in the global political and economic structure. After 1976, 
the Five Principles appeared in over 90 documents jointly released by China 
and other foreign states, framing the oﬃcial foundation for China’s diplo-
matic relations with over 100 countries.16 In recent years, the Five Principles 
have uniformly appeared in the oﬃcial language of the Chinese government, 
such as Sino-African declarations at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC),17 China’s White Paper on African Policy (2006),18 and also the 
preamble of the Chinese Constitution.19 On June 28, 2004, the 50th anni-
versary of Zhou and Nehru’s meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao asserted China’s 
half-century as “a faithful practitioner” of the Five Principles, which had 
“long been held as the cornerstone of China’s independent foreign policy of 
peace.”20
While noninterference has been a recurrent theme in the oﬃcial rhetoric 
of the People’s Republic of China throughout its existence, the principle has 
had varying relevance in shaping the foreign policy practices of the state in 
Africa. From the 1950s to 1970s, Beijing’s foreign policy outlook was viewed 
through the ideologically colored lens of Marxism and emphasis was placed 
on supporting “genuine socialist insurrection or revolution” throughout 
Africa and contributing to the cause of anti-imperialism.21 Honoring the sov-
ereign rights of foreign states on the basis of equality and not interfering in 
their domestic aﬀairs was a concern largely absent from Beijing’s policy pref-
erences, as in the campaign against imperialism, distinctions were made 
between colonial or white-minority governments, which it undermined by 
backing national liberation movements, and postcolonial states, which it rec-
ognized and supported, such as Zambia and Tanzania. Regardless of the laud-
able merit in aiding liberation movements in their struggle against apartheid 
regimes, in this discussion of China’s adherence to noninterference, it should 
be noted that Beijing’s actions were clearly not restrained by its pledge to 
honor the Five Principles in its relations with every state. Ian Taylor (2006) 
makes this contradiction clearly evident by noting that within only a few 
short years of the Zhou-Nehru Panch Sheel declaration and the Bandung con-
16 “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” People’s Daily.
17 “Addis Ababa Action Plan,” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, September 20, 2006, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/t404123.htm (accessed January 27, 2009). 
18 “China’s African Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
January 12, 2006, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm (accessed January 27, 2009). 
19 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, preamble.
20 Wen (2004).
21 Taylor (2006): 24.
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ference, China shipped arms and provided training to Algerian rebels during 
their 1957-1962 struggle for independence from France, initiating a pattern 
of supporting insurrection movements in Africa throughout much of the 
1960s.22 Beijing’s support for liberation movements and postcolonial govern-
ments largely receded as China was engulfed in the turbulence of the Cul-
tural Revolution. 
As China emerged from the exceptional turmoil of the Cultural Revolu-
tion in the early 1970s, Beijing’s policy preferences shifted signiﬁcantly. Frac-
tures in the Sino-Soviet relationship deepened into hostility, while bilateral 
relations between the U.S. and China improved. Beijing continued to sup-
port liberation movements in its attempt to encourage socialist revolution 
and ﬁght imperialism but now also aspired to curb Soviet inﬂuence in Africa. 
In line with this additional policy objective, China provided training and 
arms to insurrectionist groups pitted against not only colonial and white 
minority governments but also rival Soviet-backed groups.23 Opposing the 
Soviets while simultaneously supporting socialism and anti-imperialism cre-
ated a complex foreign policy agenda that often proved problematic and self-
defeating, demonstrated most clearly by the example of Chinese involvement 
in the Angolan liberation struggle and subsequent civil war. At various points 
in the Angolan liberation struggle and civil war, Beijing funneled arms and 
assistance into rival MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA factions. By 1975, in a 
switch of allegiances, China supported a FNLA/UNITA coalition backed by 
the United States and apartheid South Africa against the Soviet and Cuban-
supported MPLA, only to completely retreat from the situation before an 
eventual MPLA victory.24 In the course of its involvement, Beijing struggled 
to balance its competing policy objectives of ﬁghting imperialism, supporting 
socialism, and opposing Soviet hegemonism. The Angolan case is particularly 
relevant to this discussion, as it clearly shows that China’s foreign policy 
agenda came to be framed by a number of overarching goals, but notably 
absent among them was the importance of honoring the principle of nonin-
terference and the Angolans’ right to self-determination. Chinese policymak-
ers ignored oﬃcial pledge for noninterference in practice, and Beijing became 
another player in the violent game of Cold War politics. 
22 Ibid., 23-31.
23 Ibid., 42-46.
24 Ibid., 77-81.
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Noninterference in the Reform and Opening up Period
Following the death of Mao Zedong, a cohort of pragmatic reformers led by 
Deng Xiaoping seized the reins of government, dismissed the radical ideolog-
ical excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and redirected China under the 
Reform and Opening Up policies, emphasizing modernization and economic 
development. Beijing’s approach to Africa mirrored the domestic changes at 
home, and the preceding policies of the 1950s-70s deﬁned by Marxist ideol-
ogy, supporting liberation, socialist revolution, and countering American and 
Soviet hegemony, were replaced by the reform era government’s policy of tak-
ing a state-centered approach to Africa and emphasizing stability. The post-
Maoist regime concerned itself with forging its place in the international 
economic system and winning access to the resources and markets needed to 
fuel its growing economy, not expending its resources on the project of desta-
bilizing enemy regimes in the interest of supporting socialism. Emerging late 
as a player in the international community and economic system after years 
of relative isolation, Beijing found itself to be relatively weak and lacking the 
resources or international standing of its Western counterparts. Lacking the 
resources to project its interests far outside its borders and in need of diplo-
matic allies and economic partners, Beijing began to court ruling regimes 
with little distinction for their socialist credentials or political composition 
and oppose insurrections, particularly those backed by outside powers. In an 
ironic change of position, considering its own behavior in Angola and else-
where, China’s leadership began condemning the Soviet Union for its support 
of insurgencies, which destabilized African states, stiﬂed their economic 
growth, and caused unnecessary hardship.25 
At this time, China resuscitated its usage of noninterference in shaping its 
actions, aﬃrming the sovereign right of African states and other developing 
nations to determine their own internal aﬀairs. China engaged weaker states 
which manifested in its extension of aid “with no political strings attached”26 
and its demand that the Five Principles be respected by all nations. Consider-
ing the historical shifts in the relevance of the principle of noninterference in 
shaping China’s foreign policy practices, which was of negligible importance 
until after the post-Maoist era, oﬃcial claims by Chinese leaders that their 
government has consistently honored the right of noninterference in its deal-
ings with other states for the last ﬁfty years or longer should be viewed criti-
cally. Beijing has embraced or ignored noninterference in dealings with 
25 Ibid., 50.
26 Wen (2004).
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foreign states in line with its perceived self-interests, and while noninterfer-
ence has gained increased signiﬁcance in the post-Maoist era, that importance 
is grounded in Beijing’s current interests. As China’s interests evolve with its 
expanding investment in Africa, increased resources for projecting its inﬂu-
ence, and changing threats to its property and citizens, the present signiﬁ-
cance of noninterference will likely change as interventions in the domestic 
aﬀairs of Beijing’s African partners become viewed as necessary or desirable.
Beijing’s Interests Driving Noninterference 
China’s current emphasis on the doctrine of noninterference is shaped by its 
perceived strategic self-interests. Engaging African states without prejudice to 
their domestic policies or political composition and honoring their right to 
noninterference facilitates important economic objectives, such as acquiring 
the raw materials and energy supplies required to fuel China’s rapid economic 
growth, opening markets to its abundant manufactured exports and provid-
ing its companies with investment opportunities. Noninterference has also 
proved extremely useful in furthering Beijing’s diplomatic goal of winning 
over a large group of allies in the developing world. It is this large cohort of 
numerous albeit less powerful states that can help deﬂect Western criticisms 
of China’s human rights abuses, marginalize the international status of Tai-
wan, and limit the hegemonic power of the United States.27 These weaker 
states have an obvious interest in China’s promotion of noninterference – 
establishing an international norm that stronger states should not use their 
power to force their will on weaker states serves to support the independent 
decision-making of developing nations. China’s advocacy of noninterference 
has thus helped China win the diplomatic support of weak state allies and 
secure access to their economic resources and domestic markets.
African states are central to China’s current economic aspirations. By 
extending aid and investment without conditions and promising to honor 
the doctrine of noninterference in its partnerships, China has won increased 
access to African markets, energy resources and other raw materials. In recent 
years, securing a reliable supply of African oil has become an increasingly 
important objective. China was once a leading Asian oil exporter, but as the 
country’s economy expanded in the 1980s and ’90s, domestic oil consump-
tion surged, and by 1993, China became a net oil importer. National oil 
27 Denis M. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Signiﬁcance, and Consequences,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies 44:3 (2006): 460-461.
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demand has only continued to grow, and China has become the world’s sec-
ond largest oil importer, behind only the United States. To meet its increas-
ing needs, China has turned to many of Africa’s largely untapped reserves and 
now imports roughly one-third of its oil from Africa.28 Because sustaining 
economic development is the central overarching goal of China’s national 
policy agenda, acquiring access to foreign oil and meeting national energy 
demands has become a critical issue for national concern for China, and 
“energy policy (has been) elevated to the level of strategic national security.”29 
Approaching states with a policy of noninterference has proven particularly 
important in China’s eﬀort to secure access to energy resources, as many oil-
rich African states are particularly despotic, unstable, and/or ﬂagrant human 
rights abusers. Advocating noninterference allows Beijing to ignore those 
shortcomings and focus on the business of energy extraction, without the 
trouble of demanding political or economic reforms from its partner states. 
China has also courted African states as markets for its exports and invest-
ment projects. As an emerging export-driven economic powerhouse, Beijing 
is always exploring the globe for consumer markets to which it might export 
its goods. In recent years, Sino-African trade has increased dramatically, from 
around $10 billion in 2000 to $106.8 billion in 2008,30 with China mostly 
exporting “electrical equipment and machinery (41%), textiles (18%), gar-
ments (11%), and new technology (8%), such as electronic and information 
facilities, software, and aviation and aerospace equipment.”31 African states 
have also proven to be appealing destinations for Chinese ﬁrms to invest, 
particularly in securing infrastructure contracts. As latecomers into the inter-
national market, Chinese companies have often found themselves at a com-
petitive disadvantage to Western ﬁrms with more technical expertise and 
experience. In Africa, however, Chinese companies have found niche markets 
where they can invest with limited competition from foreign ﬁrms. 
The doctrine of noninterference has helped China win access to these criti-
cal niche markets by allowing Chinese ﬁrms to invest in states and regions 
where competition from Western companies is limited. While Western ﬁrms 
28 Stephanie Hanson, “China, Africa and Oil,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 6, 2008, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/china_africa_and_oil.html (accessed February 5, 2009).
29 J. Ndumbe Anyu and J.P. Afam Ifedi, “China’s Ventures in Africa: Patterns, Prospects, and 
Implications for Africa’s Development,” Mediterranean Quarterly 19:4 (Fall 2008): 96.
30 “Chinese-African trade volume hits all time high to reach US$106.8b,” Xinhua News 
Agency, January 20, 2009, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/americaando
ceanreport/200901/20090106014983.html (accessed February 5, 2009).
31 Li Anshan, “China’s New Policy toward Africa,” in China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and 
Inﬂuence, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008): 31.
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have often been dissuaded by the risks associated with investing in tradition-
ally unstable states or been inhibited by economic sanctions placed on par-
ticular regimes by Western governments, Chinese ﬁrms have distinguished 
themselves as being less “risk-averse” than their Western competitors, invest-
ing in traditionally volatile states such as Angola and the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo, and in economic sectors, such as construction, that have 
been largely ignored by Western investors.32 Supported by the Chinese gov-
ernment, which often bundles low-interest loan and aid oﬀers with invest-
ment projects handled by Chinese ﬁrms and woos African state leaders with 
goodwill projects such as hospitals and schools and the promise of noninter-
ference, Chinese companies have entered economic sectors and states long 
neglected by Western investors, who are deterred by regional instability 
and recalcitrant governments.33 By extending aid and investing without plac-
ing conditions on partner regimes, China has won access to markets and 
resources largely oﬀ limits to Western competitors and a reputation as a reli-
able business partner. In the eyes of many African leaders, because Chinese 
promises for aid and infrastructure projects are unconditional, backed up by 
Beijing’s promise to honor noninterference, they are more likely to be ful-
ﬁlled without interruption than those made by Western states, who may 
delay projects to insist on reforms aimed at combating corruption or other 
perceived problems.34 In engaging African states with promises of noninter-
ference, China has successfully charmed many ruling regimes and won access 
to strategic resources important for supporting its growing economy, espe-
cially oil, secured markets for its exports and helped its companies win invest-
ment contracts. 
China’s renewed focus on noninterference has also helped the country 
enhance its strategic geopolitical position. In his essay, “the Beijing Consen-
sus,” a term ﬁrst articulated by Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004: 40), who sug-
gests that Chinese leaders have identiﬁed American hegemony as a major 
threat to their continued development, with many uncertain “about whether 
or not the U.S. will ‘allow’ China to rise.”35 American hegemony, which has 
in many respects eroded since the 1970s on the global scale, has nevertheless 
remained prominent in the East Asian region, largely facilitated by the con-
tinued subordination of Japan, an economic power, to the United States in 
32 Tull (2006): 468-469.
33 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with 
Africa,” African Studies Review, 50:3 (December 2007): 80.
34 Tull (2006): 466-7.
35 Joshua Cooper Ramo, “The Beijing Consensus,” The Foreign Policy Center (2004), http://
joshuaramo.com/_ﬁles/pdf/The-Beijing-Consensus.pdf (accessed February 3, 2009): 40.
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many critical areas of foreign and military aﬀairs. 36 Beijing, furthermore, sees 
many international organizations, such as the UN, as instruments that sus-
tain American or ‘Western’ hegemony.37 Because of the continued military 
and economic might of the U.S., its prominent position within international 
organizations, and its continued inﬂuence in East Asia, both directly and 
through traditional allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, Beijing 
sees a need to check American power, lest it hinder Chinese development. 
Because China greatly lags behind the United States in terms of military 
might, Beijing has sought to develop “asymmetric” power that might serve as 
“strategic leverage” to prevent the U.S. from using its power to restrict Chi-
na’s growth and increasing global inﬂuence.38 China has decided to place spe-
cial emphasis on increasing its global soft power, actively wooing states 
throughout the developing world by stressing mutual beneﬁts, “win-win” 
relations, and the promise of noninterference.39 In this process, China has 
won a large number of allies in the Third World who can help China counter 
U.S. inﬂuence and support Beijing’s assertions of noninterference, limiting 
the impact of Western states and IFIs’ demands that developing countries 
(including China) implement internal reforms.40 China’s allies from Africa 
and elsewhere in the developing world have also helped China in pursuing its 
main ideological foreign policy objective, persuading states not to diplomati-
cally recognize Taiwan41 in order to isolate it internationally and undermine 
any aspirations of hoping to achieve formal independence. In pursuit of these 
diplomatic objectives, countering American hegemony through the projec-
tion of soft power and ensuring international nonrecognition of Taiwan, the 
principle of noninterference has proven to be a useful diplomatic tool for 
China. The Chinese have found noninterference to be a powerful brand used 
for projecting Chinese inﬂuence into Africa – a brand that most African lead-
ers and some populations have embraced. 
China’s brand of noninterference has had particularly strong currency 
when transposed against the painful historical experience of Western colo-
nialism and the promotion of neoliberalism in the region. China, unlike 
36 Mark Beeson, “Hegemonic Transition in East Asia: The Dynamics of Chinese and Ameri-
can Power,” Review of International Studies 35:1 (January 2009): 96-7.
37 Piet Konings, “China and Africa in the Era of Neo-liberal Globalization,” CODESRIA 
Bulletin 1&2 (2007): 17.
38 Ramo, 38.
39 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Oﬀensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World 
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2007): 38-39. 
40 Ibid., 41.
41 Ibid., 42.
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most Western states, is not tainted as a former imperialist power, and having 
overcome its own historical ‘humiliations’ at the hands of imperialists by 
embracing an independent developmental strategy for generating rapid eco-
nomic growth, is widely viewed as an appealing model for many African 
states to imitate.42 The China model has clearly presented a challenge to the 
“Washington Consensus,” a set of policy instruments advocated by elites in 
the United States and international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) ﬁrst outlined 
by John Williamson (1990) as an approach for resolving the debt crisis in 
Latin America (and later applied globally). The ten instruments intended to 
serve as conditions or reforms for states receiving loans include import liber-
alization, privatization of state enterprises, ﬁscal discipline, reductions of 
public expenditures (particularly subsidies), tax cuts, market-determined 
interest rates and exchange rates, import liberalization, liberalization of for-
eign direct investment (FDI), and deregulation of markets.43 In China and in 
many African states, the Washington Consensus reforms are viewed with 
skepticism, as they are associated with social destabilization and the substan-
tial human suﬀering, most critically among women, children, and the poor, 
many countries endured while implementing Structural Adjustment Policies 
during the 1980s.44 
In recent decades, Beijing has sought to reconcile its aversion to condition-
ality, expressed in its advocacy of non-interference, with its desire to liberalize 
its trade policies and engage in the global market. In its approach to Inter-
governmental Organizations (IGOs), China has sought to strike a careful bal-
ance between its desire to participate in IGOs, such as the IMF, WTO/
GATT, and World Bank and thus reaping the beneﬁts of increased engage-
ment with the global market and oﬀers of loans and technical training oﬀered 
by these organization, while simultaneously seeking to avoid the conditional-
ity, i.e. ‘interference’ in its domestic aﬀairs and those of others, formally 
required them. As noted by Hempson-Jones (2005), China, regardless of its 
expressed reluctance to bind itself to the requirements of conditionality in its 
domestic aﬀairs, has nevertheless from the 1980s won access to World Bank 
loans and technical resources by acquiescing to demands from the organiza-
tion, such as the devaluation of its currency, the removal of import restrictions, 
42 Sautman and Yan (2007): 80.
43 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reforms,” in Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much has Happened? ed. John Williamson (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1990). 
44 Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly, and Frances Stewart, ed., Adjustment with a 
Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987): 
1-2.
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and the acceptance of competitive bidding by international ﬁrms in its 
domestic development contracts.45 In its more limited relationship with the 
IMF, China has likewise agreed to demands that it devalue its currency (in 
1985), end restrictions on international payments, and work toward estab-
lishing currency convertibility. In regards to the WTO, China has accepted 
the most expansive terms of conditionality: “non-discrimination through the 
unconditional most-favored nation (MFN) clause; a preference for the use of 
price-based measures, such as tariﬀs; . . . avoidance of unfair trade practices, 
such as export subsidization or dumping,” reforms aimed at establishing 
independent judicial institutions in China, and an acceptance of the over-
arching authority of the WTO dispute mechanism.46 In its role as a foreign 
investor and increasingly important source of loans and aid in the Third 
World, China has, however, denounced the same kind of conditionality and 
subordination of autonomy demanded by IGOs that it has formally accepted 
at home, insisting that it is a diﬀerent kind of outside presence – one that 
respects the principle of non-interference, honors the right of national sover-
eignty, and refuses to impose conditionality upon other developing countries 
in exchange for the extension of aid and investment. 
Viewed in contrast to the neoliberal reforms prescribed by the Washington 
Consensus, China’s stated policy of noninterference has great appeal through-
out much of Africa, as recently noted by scholars such as Wei Liang (2008)47 
and Chris Alden (2007).48 As opposed to the policy prescriptions demanded 
by Washington and IFIs, the “Beijing Consensus” argues that there is no uni-
versal blueprint for economic development. States should instead follow a 
course of “groping for stones to cross the river,” taking a pragmatic, indepen-
dently determined path that evolves amidst changing circumstances.49 The 
Beijing Consensus involves innovation, chaos management – maintaining 
social and political stability by emphasizing equality and sustainability, and 
self-determination – the use of asymmetric power to counter hegemonic 
power and maintain independence in decision-making.50 African ruling 
regimes can appreciate that China presents a model of development focusing 
45 Justin S. Hempson-Jones, “The Evolution of China’s Engagement with International 
Organizations: Towards a Liberal Policy,” Asian Survey 45:5, (2005): 708-9.
46 Ibid., 709-710.
47 Wei Liang, “New Africa Policy: China’s Quest for Oil and Inﬂuence,” in Harmonious 
World and China’s New Foreign Policy, ed. Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc Blanchard (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2008): 162.
48 Chris Alden, China in Africa (New York: Zed Books, 2007): 60-61.
49 Ramo (2004): 4. 
50 Ibid., 11-12.
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on maintaining social stability and economic growth without necessitating 
rapid democratization or the reform of political or economic institutions – 
moves that are perceived as contributors to social and political dislocation. 
Buying the Brand: Africa’s Embrace of the Noninterference Doctrine
China’s projection of soft power into Africa, facilitated in no small part by 
the promise of noninterference, has in recent years proven successful in win-
ning the approval of most African rulers and large sections of populations. 
Ali Zafar (2007),51 a macroeconomist with the World Bank admits that Chi-
na’s pledge of noninterference in African countries’ internal aﬀairs and lack of 
lending conditions on governance or ﬁscal management have elicited positive 
reactions from several governments. In April 2006, former Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo expressed to Chinese President Hu Jintao his vision that 
“the twenty-ﬁrst century is the century for China to lead the world. And 
when you (Chinese) are leading the world, we (Africans) want to be close 
behind you.”52 Such sentiments have also been echoed and re-echoed by lead-
ers like Denis Sassou N’Guesso of Congo Brazzaville, Mamadou Tandja of 
Niger, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir of Sudan, and the infamous Robert 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who on the twenty-ﬁfth anniversary of the country’s 
independence, announced that “we must turn toward the East, where the sun 
rises.” However, the sense of appreciation for noninterference, and solidarity 
from African leaders was summed up most succinctly by Ethiopian president, 
Meles Zenawi, when he addressed the China-African Summit in Beijing in 
November 2006. He stated, “China was always at the side of Africans, which 
created mutual trust between us. China also deserves credit for never interfer-
ing in the political aﬀairs of the continent.”53 With most of these leaders not-
ing that the Chinese back their words with actions as highways, railroads, 
hydroelectric dams, stadia and other infrastructure projects that are con-
structed on schedule, they readily ignore outside criticisms of China’s behav-
ior in Africa and commend Beijing for its pragmatic approach toward Africa’s 
economic well being. 
51 Ali Zafar, “The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeco-
nomic, Trade, Investment and Aid Links, World Bank Research Observer (Spring 2007). 
52 See Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in 
Africa (New York: Nation Books, 2009):11.
53 See “Beijing Summit & Third Ministerial Conference of Forum on China-Africa Cooper-
ation,” November 3-5, 2006 http://english.focacsummit.org (accessed February 12, 2009). 
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In spite of sporadic resentment against the Chinese in certain African pop-
ulations, there is a general sense of approval for Chinese engagements and for 
the policy of noninterference. The 2007 Pew Forum Global Attitudes Project 
revealed the magnitude of China’s success in winning popular favor. Polling 
in ten countries across sub-Saharan Africa, Pew found overwhelmingly favor-
able views toward China and the perceived eﬀect of its growing global power, 
with favorable views outnumbering negative views two-to-one in every coun-
try other than South Africa. In Mali and Ivory Coast, favorable views of 
China topped 90% and, in Senegal and Kenya, 80%. In Nigeria, the only 
African country where trend data was available, favorable views of China had 
jumped 16%, from 59% to 75%, in only one year.54 The report also found 
that while most sub-Saharan African respondents generally considered the 
inﬂuence of the U.S. in their countries to be a positive factor, a substantially 
higher number considered China’s inﬂuence to be a “good thing” for their 
country. Of the ten countries polled, only respondents from South Africa 
considered the inﬂuence of the U.S. to be more beneﬁcial than China’s.55 
On the speciﬁc issue of China’s noninterference in domestic matters, the 
Pew Forum Global Attitude Project is mirrored by a more recent survey that 
breaks away from the anecdotal evidence often alluded to in the discussion of 
African perspectives on the issue of noninterference among a wide range of 
issues that deﬁne Africa’s relations with China.
As depicted in table 1, Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong (2009)56 show 
how more people strongly approve or approve of noninterference than 
strongly disapprove or disapprove in each of the ten countries surveyed.
Sudan shows the highest approval percentage, which may be reﬂective of 
China’s economic participation in the country, which occurs in the midst of 
broad global disapproval of the government’s handling of the genocide in 
Darfur. Again in this set of data, South Africa has a narrower approval mar-
gin with many people choosing the “don’t know” category. By oﬀering an 
attractive model for development, aid, investment, and infrastructure devel-
opment without conditions, and emphasizing win-win relations and mutual 
beneﬁts under the banner of noninterference and developing world solidar-
ity, China has, in under a decade, projected its inﬂuence extensively through-
54 The Global Attitudes Project included respondents from 10 sub-Saharan countries, Ethio-
pia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
“The Pew Global Attitudes Project: Global Unease with Major World Powers,” Pew Research Center 
( June 27, 2007) http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf (accessed February 12, 2009): 41.
55 Ibid., 45.
56 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “African Perspectives on China-Africa Links,” China 
Quarterly 199 (September 2009): 736-738.
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out Africa and, at least in the short term, won the favor of an impressive 
number of African populations and statesmen.
Emerging Challenges, Conﬂicts and Complications
While China’s reemergence in Africa has been generally greeted with enthusi-
asm, it has also faced substantial criticism and condemnation from many 
statesmen, intellectuals, and ordinary Africans. Scholars J. Ndumbe Anyu 
and J.P. Afam Ifedi (2008) have noted two distinctive viewpoints in the liter-
ature concerning China’s recent engagement with Africa: “exploitation and 
opportunity.”57 Advocates of the latter perspective have suggested that China’s 
ventures in Africa should be understood as distinctive from Western colonial-
ism. China’s oﬀers of aid and investment without conditions present African 
states with an opportunity to develop the infrastructure and trade links 
needed to establish a course of sustainable development. More skeptical sup-
porters of the exploitation perspective focus on China’s self-interested moti-
vations in Africa. China is considered similar to previous Western exploiters 
and interested only in enabling is own development. In this view, Beijing 
57 Anyu and Ifedi (2008): 93.
Table 1
For Africa, China’s Policy of “Non-interference” is:
Country A good 
policy (%)
Basically good, 
but with some 
problems (%)
More 
harmful than 
good (%)
Quite 
harmful 
(%)
Don’t 
know 
(%)
Number
Botswana 22.2 34.3 18.7 9.1 15.7 230
Egypt 34.4 23.6 19.5 7.2 15.4 195
Ethiopia 14.3 50.5 16.3 11.2 7.7 196
Ghana 24.0 32.8 13.6 19.2 10.4 250
Kenya 31.1 35.8 16.6 12.4 4.1 193
Nigeria 17.3 31.0 14.7 12.7 24.4 197
South Africa 12.2 31.0 19.8 13.2 23.9 197
Sudan 43.2 33.6 8.0 4.8 10.4 250
Zambia 29.6 36.2 18.9 8.2 7.1 196
Total (%) 25.7 34.2 16.0 10.9 13.1 100
Total number 490 652 304 208 250 1,904
Source: Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong (2009: 738)
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seeks to extract the natural resources of African states and ﬂood their markets 
with cheap Chinese exports without contributing to lasting development 
or meaningful improvement of people’s lives.58 Tull (2006) has noted that 
China’s arrival on the continent has not fundamentally changed Africa’s posi-
tion in the global economy. African states are still largely dependent on the 
export of a small number of highly unstable commodities, which China, like 
its Western predecessors, continues to extract and import in large numbers. 
Because China maintains a highly asymmetrical power relationship, Tull is 
skeptical of China’s likelihood to encourage sustainable growth within its 
African partner states.59 More serious than criticisms that its agenda in Africa 
is self-serving, exploitative and a detrimental inﬂuence on the economic 
development of regional states, Beijing has also faced frequent public con-
demnations that its presence has bolstered regimes of dubious reputation and 
contributed to eroding the human rights situation in many African states. 
China’s willingness to engage African regimes with a ‘business-is-business’ 
approach unconcerned with their internal aﬀairs has led to criticisms that 
China’s doctrine of noninterference has allowed pariah states to circumvent 
Western sanctions and carry out egregious human rights abuses, including 
genocide, within their borders. Leaders in Beijing were surprised when inter-
national condemnation of genocide in the Sudan coalesced into a highly 
public campaign aimed at protesting China’s involvement with the Bashir 
regime. Actress Mia Farrow labeled the 2008 Olympics in Beijing as “the 
Genocide Olympics,” as part of an international movement aimed at pressur-
ing the Chinese government into “reassess(ing) its no-strings-attached back-
ing of abusive regimes across the globe” and ending its arms sales, aid and 
diplomatic support for the Bashir government.60 A 2006 report by the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations likewise emphasized China’s negative impact on 
human rights conditions in its partner states, noting its close relationship 
with the Sudan and Zimbabwe. The CFR report suggested that China had 
“protected” these countries in the United Nations Security Council and 
oﬀered an alternative source of aid and investment, thereby undermining 
Western eﬀorts to sanction repressive regimes into curbing their human rights 
58 Ibid.
59 Tull (2006): 471.
60 Ronan Farrow and Mia Farrow, “The ‘Genocide Olympics’,” Wall Street Journal, March 28, 
2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117505109799351409.html; “One Olympic Victory,” 
Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120338432062875839.
html (both accessed February 22, 2009).
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violations, and in the case of Sudan, halting its participation in genocide.61 In 
this view, China’s indiﬀerence to the internal aﬀairs of the countries has led 
to a decline in the overall human rights situation throughout Africa. Such 
perceptions have undoubtedly had a negative impact on Beijing’s interna-
tional reputation. 
In addition to international criticisms of Beijing’s contribution to the ero-
sion of human rights conditions in many African states, some scholars have 
suggested that China’s policy of noninterference may also be undermining 
political reform among its partners in the developing world. Kurlantzick 
(2007), noting China’s close relations with pariah states, suggests that Beijing 
may desire to help countries such as Iran, Burma, and Zimbabwe remain 
authoritarian – as regimes of this kind are “more likely to remain close to 
China.”62 This suggests that China may not take an entirely indiﬀerent view 
toward the institutional makeup of foreign regimes but rather favors authori-
tarian regimes. In this view, Beijing is worried that should more authoritarian 
states transition into multiparty democracies, its one-party regime will 
become increasingly isolated in the international community and face greater 
pressure to implement democratic reforms, thus threatening the Chinese 
Communist Party’s monopoly on political power.
Aside from outside criticisms that China’s emergence in Africa has led to a 
deterioration of human rights conditions and inhibited political reform, 
China, despite its warm reception from most African rulers and support in 
many segments of their respective states’ populations, has also faced substan-
tial, sometimes violent, resistance from African opponents. Advocating a pol-
icy of noninterference has not always shielded Beijing from perceptions that 
it is an active partisan in the domestic aﬀairs of its partner states. In a num-
ber of situations, China’s willingness to partner with any governing regime 
without concern for its internal behavior has contributed to the belief that it 
favors and actively supports ruling regimes in their competition with opposi-
tion parties. 
Perceived collusion between Beijing and ruling regimes has made Chinese 
personnel and property appealing targets of violence for rebel militants, 
drawing China into conﬂicts regardless of its expressed desire not to interfere 
in internal conﬂicts. On October 18, 2008, Sudanese rebels from the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked a Chinese-owned oil ﬁeld in Darfur 
and kidnapped nine Chinese workers. Of the nine workers, ﬁve were killed 
61 Anthony Lake, et al., More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa 
(Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006): 40-41. 
62 Kurlantzick (2007): 41-42.
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and four were eventually rescued.63 The October 2008 kidnapping followed 
attacks on Chinese ﬁelds that took place in October and December 2007. 
In addition to JEM, another rebel group, the Liberation Movement-Unity 
faction, has suggested that the arriving Chinese companies will be considered 
“military targets.”64 According to journalist Mohamed Osman, “Darfur 
rebels . . . accuse China of indirectly funding the Sudanese government’s war 
eﬀort in Darfur by massively investing in Sudan’s oil industry.”65 In the case 
of Sudan, China’s doctrine of noninterference has not prevented rebels and 
outside activists from believing that Beijing and Chinese ﬁrms have become 
active players in Sudanese domestic politics. Since China is widely considered 
an important backer of the Bashir regime, Chinese workers and property 
have become targets of violence for rebels opposed to the government. The 
trend has been mirrored in other areas of Africa, with anti-government mili-
tants leading high proﬁle attacks on Chinese targets in Nigeria and Ethiopia 
in recent years.66 
A 2008 Foreign Aﬀairs article identiﬁed a visible change in China’s policy 
of noninterference in response to the growing risks associated with support-
ing unpopular regimes. While China’s rhetorical advocacy of noninterference 
has continued, in practice, Beijing has become concerned with the negative 
eﬀect of supporting pariah regimes on China’s international reputation and 
the threats it can generate for its citizens and property abroad. As a result, 
Beijing has quietly reduced its unconditional support for pariah regimes, 
tried to inﬂuence their partners into conforming to international norms and 
contributed to international peacekeeping missions, most notably in the UN 
mission to the Sudan.67 Recent developments have thus supported the view 
that China’s strategy of noninterference should be viewed as evolving rather 
than static, and Beijing may be backing away from extending unconditional 
support to the most unstable and unpopular regimes, putting quiet pressure 
63 “Rescued workers in Sudan to return home,” Xinhua, November 5, 2008, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-11/05/content_7175495.htm (accessed February 17, 2009).
64 “9 Chinese oil workers kidnapped in Sudan,” International Herald Tribune, October 19, 
2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/19/news/ML-Sudan-China-Kidnap.php (accessed 
February 17, 2009).
65 “Darfur Rebels Attack Oil Field, Warn Chinese to Leave Sudan,” The Washington Post, 
October 25, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/25/
AR2007102502510_pf.html (accessed February 17, 2009).
66 Jeﬀrey Gettleman, “Ethiopian Rebels Kill 70 at Chinese-Run Oil Field,” New York Times, 
April 25, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/world/africa/25ethiopia.html?_r=1&scp
=7&sq=nigeria%20attack%20chinese&st=cse (accessed February 18, 2009). 
67 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy,” 
Foreign Aﬀairs 87:1 ( January/February 2008).
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on its allies to curb their human rights abuses and contributing to peacekeep-
ing forces in the interest of maintaining regional stability. 
In addition to the threat of having its citizens and property targeted by 
rebel groups opposed to Chinese-supported regimes, Beijing has also faced 
increasing anti-Chinese sentiment in some African states, most clearly evi-
dent in the electoral politics of transitional democracies. Attempting to 
implement a policy of noninterference has created a recurrent problem for 
Chinese operations in Africa – by generously supporting ruling regimes with-
out concern for how its partners use that support in furthering their own 
interests, Beijing can be seen, in the eyes of some segments of African societ-
ies, as taking sides in internal politics – on behalf of ruling parties and at the 
expense of opposition parties. These sentiments have allowed opportunistic 
populist leaders to make the claim that ruling parties are puppets of the 
Chinese government, threatening their state’s independence by taking march-
ing orders from Beijing, not the general public. The clearest example of anti-
Chinese populism playing a part in African electoral politics has taken place 
in Zambia, where Patriotic Front (PF) presidential candidate, Michael Sata, 
has emerged as a major political player by running on an “explicit anti-China 
platform.”68 
Zambia is a country intimately economically tied to China based on its 
heavy investment in Zambian copper mining, an industry that by 2006, 
made up over three fourths of national exports.69 Having nationalized for-
merly British-owned mines following independence in 1964, Zambian lead-
ers, facing an economic crisis amidst a worldwide economic downturn and a 
corresponding drop in copper prices, elected to privatize the mines under a 
structural adjustment program backed by international ﬁnancial institutions. 
Because copper prices remained low, privatization did not result in initial 
success, and the mines, if purchased at all, were sold oﬀ extremely cheaply 
and usually associated with major concessions granted by the Zambian gov-
ernment. In the 1990s, despite the structural adjustments and privatization 
reforms encouraged by IFIs, the Zambian copper industry and the country’s 
overall economy remained insolvent until ﬁnally buoyed by rising global cop-
per prices propelled by the demand of the rapidly growing Chinese economy.70 
68 Rohit Negi, “Beyond the “Chinese Scramble”: The Political Economy of Anti-China Sen-
timent in Zambia,” African Geographical Review 27 (2008): 48.
69 World Bank, “The International Development Association Country Assistance Strategy 
for the Republic of Zambia,” April 8, 2008, 5 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/04/30/000310607_20080430135453/Rendered/PDF/4
3352mainoptmzd0CAS0IDA1R200810097.pdf (accessed February 24, 2009).
70 Negi (2008): 49-51.
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In 1998, hoping to secure greater access to Zambian copper, the Chinese 
Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Group purchased the eﬀectively abandoned 
Chambishi mine in the Copperbelt region, renovated the mine and constructed 
new surrounding facilities. After $100 million was invested in the mine, it 
was put into operation in 2001, joining a major wave of Chinese investment 
throughout much of Zambia.71 After experiencing sluggish growth in the 
1990s, when real GDP fell by an average of 0.2% per year from 1991 to 
1998, Zambia’s economy, driven by its rejuvenated mining sector and rising 
world copper prices, quickly rebounded and posted 5% annual growth 
between 2000 and 2006.72 
Despite its central role in Zambia’s economic recovery, China has faced 
growing popular resentment throughout much of the country. As early as 
2004, many Zambians, particularly miners and their union representatives, 
complained that wages, working conditions, and safety standards at Chinese-
owned mines were far below national standards. The situation was exacer-
bated by the Zambian government’s refusal to allow union representatives to 
organize workers in the Chinese-owned mines in Chambishi. 73 Tensions 
became particularly high in 2005, when an explosion at a munitions factory 
that killed at least 46 Zambian workers was blamed on the lax safety stan-
dards of its Chinese owners.74 The Chambishi explosion initiated a recurrent 
pattern of strikes, riots and acts of violence in the Copperbelt that has per-
sisted up to today.75 
China’s policy of noninterference became particularly problematic when 
PF leader Michael Sata launched his 2006 presidential campaign on an anti-
Chinese platform. Condemning the Chinese as exploiters and proﬁteers and 
accusing the ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) of collu-
sion with Beijing, Sata declared that once elected president, he would recog-
nize Taiwanese independence and expel “bogus” Chinese investors from 
Zambia.76 Clearly troubled by Sata’s threat to its interests in the country, 
China’s oﬃcial representative to Zambia, Li Baodong, openly abandoned 
the oﬃcial commitment to noninterference, and in the run up to the 2006 
71 Alden (2007): 73-74.
72 World Bank (2008): 4.
73 Alden (2007): 74.
74 Michael Wines, “China’s Inﬂuence in Africa Arouses Some Resistance,” New York Times, 
February 10, 2007,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/10/world/africa/10assess.html?_r=1&scp=
9&sq=zambia%20mine%20explosion&st=cse (accessed February 25, 2008). 
75 Negi (2008): 55-56.
76 Joseph J. Schatz, “Zambian Hopeful Takes a Swing at China,” Washington Post, September 25, 
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/24/AR2006092400915.
html (accessed February 25, 2009).
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election, threatened to pull China’s investments from the country should the 
PF win the elections.77 Li’s interference, however, only fueled the ﬁre of anti-
Chinese sentiments, and Sata surged in the polls, receiving nearly 30% of 
votes, a marked improvement over his dismal 4% share in his earlier 2001 
campaign.78 Despite his strong turnout, MMD candidate, Levy Mwanawasa, 
defeated Sata. As the results were announced, Sata accused Mwanawasa of 
stealing the election and violent riots among PF supporters broke out, in 
which Chinese-owned shops were attacked and looted.79 Sata’s anti-Chinese 
populism has in recent years maintained its strength. In 2008, following the 
sudden death of Mwanawasa, impromptu elections were held, and MMD 
successor, Rupiah Banda, only narrowly edged Sata in a slim 40 to 38% vic-
tory.80 From the experience of recent electoral politics in Zambia, it has 
become evident that rising anti-Chinese sentiments have made adhering to a 
doctrine of noninterference increasingly diﬃcult. China’s representative, Li 
Baodong, was tempted into becoming publicly involved in the 2006 election 
but his threat of withdrawing Chinese investment in the event of a PF vic-
tory only fueled public perceptions that Beijing was trying to manipulate, 
bolstering Sata’s campaign. In the 2008 election, Beijing took a lower proﬁle, 
suggesting that Chinese leaders had learned from Li’s 2006 experience, 
although the PF nevertheless made substantial electoral gains, only narrowly 
missing victory. The Zambian example thus demonstrates that while nonin-
terference clearly helped China win access to African markets and resources 
and in many respects, clearly beneﬁted its African partners, it has not allevi-
ated local fears of Chinese domination and exploitation or prevented popular 
anti-Chinese backlashes. 
An emerging and growing complication of China’s economic advances in 
Africa is the charge against Chinese businesses by international observers and 
most particularly, African populations, over poor working conditions, low 
worker pay standards, and de-industrialization – the displacement of local 
infant industries in these countries as a result of ﬂooding the markets with 
cheap Chinese products.81 In 2005, a study by the International Labour 
77 Alden (2007): 75.
78 Electoral Commission of Zambia, “Election Results Index” (2008), http://www.elections.
org.zm/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=16&Itemid=78 (accessed Febru-
ary 25, 2009).
79 David Blair, “Rioters Attack Chinese after Zambian Poll,” Telegraph, October 3, 2006, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1530464/Rioters-attack-Chinese-after-Zambian-
poll.html (accessed February 25, 2009). 
80 “Zambia Swears in a New President,” New York Times, November 2, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/11/03/world/africa/03zambia.html (accessed February 25, 2009).
81 For more on de-industrialization, see Sachikonye L. 2008. “Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
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Organization (ILO) of 11 construction sites in Tanzania found that four of 
the sites surveyed displayed “exceptionally low standards, with long working 
hours, low pay, low-standard occupational safety and health and a poor 
record on workers’ rights’. Three of the four sites were operated by Chinese 
contractors.82 African workers at the Chambishi copper mine and smelter in 
Zambia have also revolted several times against the Chinese management for 
similar conditions. With regards to de-industrialization, Ogunsanwo (2008) 
refers to instances of accusations of Chinese companies dumping cheap 
goods, produced through cheap labor in China, on the Nigerian market, thus 
displacing infant industries in Nigeria.
Also, in spite of the attractiveness of the noninterference doctrine, agree-
ments between Chinese institutions and African governments have however 
favored labor from China over both trained and untrained African labor. 
Tied to China’s Export and Import (EXIM) Bank loan to Angola in 2004 is 
the agreement that 70 percent of the public tenders for the construction and 
civil engineering contracts tabled for Angola’s reconstruction will be awarded 
to Chinese enterprises approved by Beijing. The remaining 30 percent has 
been allocated to the Angolan private sector to encourage domestic participa-
tion in the reconstruction eﬀorts (Corkin, 2008).83 Such arrangements have 
sometimes fueled anti-Chinese sentiments among certain African popula-
tions. Beijing may well reconsider the long-term practicality of noninterfer-
ence as it emerges as an established outside player in Africa. 
Concluding Remarks
This examination of China’s advocacy of the policy of noninterference in 
Africa reveals that, in opposition to Beijing’s oﬃcial pronouncement and 
many scholarly writings, noninterference has not historically been a consis-
tent deﬁning principle of China’s African foreign policy. Up to the late 1970s, 
noninterference, while advocated in Beijing’s oﬃcial rhetoric and situated 
within South-South discourse, was often rejected in China’s practical rela-
tions with the global South, subsumed in preference to the goals of support-
Agenda? Zimbabwe-China Relations” in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, ed. 
Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (Scottville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press): 124. 
82 “Baseline Study of Labour Practices on Large Construction Sites in the Republic of Tan-
zania”, International Labour Organization, Sectoral Activities Programme, Working Paper 225, 
January 2005, 10.
83 Corkin L. 2008. “All’s Fair in Loans and War: The Development of China-Angola Rela-
tions” in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, ed. Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha 
Naidu (Scottville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press): 108. 
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ing the cause of anti-imperialism, fostering socialist revolution, and later 
containing Soviet hegemony in Africa. During the Reform and Opening Up 
period, initiated in the early 1980s, noninterference gained salience in Bei-
jing’s African policy, primarily because it served the country’s interests of 
acquiring access to much needed raw materials and energy resources, and 
forging bilateral trade links to establish foreign markets for Chinese manufac-
tured goods. Noninterference has thus served as a mechanism that Beijing 
has used to gain entry into niche markets where it can eﬀectively compete 
with more established Western rivals. However, as China has quickly trans-
formed from a new emerging player forging a foothold in Africa to an estab-
lished power with substantial investments, assets, and citizens in residence, it 
is now much more intimately bound to the internal aﬀairs of its African part-
ners. One interesting dimension is the sustainability of noninterference given 
the pace of democratization in Africa. With most African countries building 
democratic structures that are fast approaching consolidation, China may be 
forced to share the stage in Africa with Western countries and institutions 
who have been advocates of democratic ideals. Thus noninterference may 
have to adapt or hold little relevance in this case. 
China will now have to address the issue of meeting security and political 
threats to its assets and citizens on the African continent and thus be moti-
vated to increasingly use its power to press its partners into protecting its 
interests. For this reason, African scholars and statesmen alike should not 
accept Chinese proclamations of noninterference at face value but should pay 
careful attention to when and how Beijing will seek to ensure that its sub-
stantial investments in Africa are not threatened. While China’s arrival in 
Africa as an alternative source of investment presents regional states with a 
unique opportunity to secure the capital and infrastructure needed to achieve 
sustainable development and escape the hegemonic dominance of the Wash-
ington Consensus, it will be up to African leaders themselves to assert their 
sovereign right to determine their own national development. They should 
not assume that China, a state with its own national agenda, will act benevo-
lently and limit itself to the policy of noninterference under any and all 
circumstances. 
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